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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
SCM LAND COMPANY,
Plaintiff-RespondentCross Appellant,

vs.

Case No. 19172

WATKINS & FABER, and WALTER P.
FABER, JR.,
Defendants-Appellants.
RESPONDENT-CROSS APPELLANT'S BRIEF
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
HONORABLE PHILIP R. FISHLER, DISTRICT JUDGE

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
SCM Land sued Watkins & Faber for its breach of a written
real property lease agreement.

Watkins & Faber claims its

breach is excused by an unperformed oral promise made by SCM
Land's predecessor-in-interest.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The trial court ruled that Watkins & Faber breached its
written lease agreement.

It also ruled that this breach

would not be excused unless Watkins & Faber established a
breached oral contract which was a condition precedent to the
written lease agreement.

The factual issues relating to this

defense and the damage issues were submitted to the jury.
The jury returned a special verdict for SCM Land finding
that there was no oral contract.

The jury also determined

that if there was such an oral contract, it was not a condition precedent to the written lease agreement, it was not
breached, and Watkins & Faber did not act within a reasonable
time after the alleged breach of the oral contract.
Judgment was entered against Watkins & Faber for $15,000
damages, together with prejudgment interest of $2,309.86 and
attorney's fees and costs of $7,034.47.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
SCM Land requests that the judgment based upon the jury
verdict be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
SCM Land controverts Watkins & Faber's Statement of Facts
and submits its own statement for the following reasons:
(a)

Watkins & Faber has selected evidence in dero-

gation of the jury verdict on liability and damages.

As the

prevailing party, SCM Land is entitled to have the evidence
viewed by this Court in support of the jury verdict.
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(b)

Material facts have been omitted.

(c)

Facts have been mischaracterized.

Watkins & Faber began leasing office space in the Newhouse Building in 1967.

(R. 290)

On June 30, 1979, Watkins

& Faber's written lease agreement for Suite 606 on the 6th
floor expired.

(R.

On July 9, 1979, Watkins &

290-291)

Faber executed a renewal lease agreement for Suite 606 with
Richard Fischer, the owner of the Newhouse Building at that
time.

(Exhibit 2-P, R.

290-298)

Fifteen months later in September 1980, SCM Land purchased the Newhouse Building from Mr. Fischer.

(R. 187)

At

that time, Watkins & Faber occupied Suite 606 under their
written lease agreement.

(R. 238-239)

SCM Land was not

aware of any claim by Watkins & Faber to space on the 6th
floor other than Suite 606.

(R. 190, 192, 193)

After SCM Land purchased the Newhouse Building, it
entered into a long-term written lease agreement with I.M.L.
for the 6th floor excluding Suite 606.

(R. 304, 305)

Subse-

quently, Watkins & Faber told SCM Land that Fischer had
orally promised them some of I.M.L.'s space on the 6th
floor.

(R. 305)

Since I.M.L. already had that space, SCM

Land offered Watkins & Faber the entire 4th floor in place of
Suite 606 or the option of keeping Suite 606 and taking additional space on another floor.
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(R. 307-308)

Watkins & Faber

rejected both of these offers and vacated Suite 606 in March
1981, fifteen months before their lease expired.

(Exhibit

"2-P", R. 307-312).
Fischer's alleged oral promise which Watkins & Faber
brought to SCM Land's attention after the space was leased to
I.M.L. on a long-term basis, was made shortly before the
renewal lease was executed.

(R. 297, 298)

Fischer promised

that "when I.M.L. moved" from the 6th Floor, he would enter
into a written lease agreement with Watkins & Faber for additional space on the 6th Floor.
never moved.

(R. 304, 305)

(R. 274, 276, 314)

I.M.L.

Nor did Fischer ever promise to

evict I.M.L. to give Wakins & Faber additional space.
275)

(R.

Furthermore, Fischer never aqreed on what additional

space would be leased, the lease term, the price, other than
the going rate, or who would pay for necessary remodeling.
(R. 275, 276)
When Watkins & Faber executed the renewal lease, no mention was made that the alleged oral promise was a prerequisite to the execution of the written lease agreement.
278)

(R.

The written lease agreement not only fails to show that

Fischer's alleged oral promise was a prerequisite to executing the lease, but is devoid of any reference to the
alleged promise.

(Exhibit 2-P)

The lease aqreement was a

pre-printed form which had blanks filled in with negotiated
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terms.

In addition, there were three initialed handwritten

chanaes concerning annual rent increases, the lease term, and
real property tax obligations.

(Exhibit ("2-P", R. 314-316)

In the space provided for additional terms, no mention was
made of this "critical" alleged oral promise.
"2-P", R.

(Exhibit

314-316)

Although Watkins & Faber claims that Fischer promised to
"enter into a written lease agreement for additional space on
the sixth floor by at least December 1979," December passed
without the execution of the written agreement for additional
space.

(R. 314)

Watkins & Faber never made a demand on

Fischer to perform.

(R. 238)

Instead they waited nine

months before making a demand and then made it on a purchaser
that knew nothing of the alleged oral promise and that had
already leased the space to its longstanding occupant.

(R.

3 0 5)

After Watkins & Faber vacated Suite 606 in March 1981,
SCM Land made substantial efforts to relet the space.
200, 207-208)

(R.

By October 1981, SCM Land had not succeeded in

reletting Suite 606.

To minimize its rental loss, SCM Land

allowed an existing tenant, Norwest Resource Consultants, out
of its lease for Suite 305 so that it could occupy a portion
of Suite 606 at a higher rental.
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(R. 208-211)

This

decreased the net rental loss by $495 per month and left
Suite 305 and a part of Suite 606 vacant.

(R. 211)

SCM Land continued its efforts to lease this space, still
without success.

(R. 211)

In March 1982, Norwest leased all

but one room of Suite 606, further reducing SCM Land's net
rental loss by $371 per month.

(R. 212)

In April 1982,

Vesta Corporation leased the last room of Suite 606 again
reducing the rental, this time by $190 per month.

(R. 218)

When Watkins & Faber's lease term ended in June 1982, only
Suite 305 was vacant.

(R. 208-218)

Throuqh its efforts and

by moving Norwest from Suite 305 to a portion of Suite 606,
SCM Land was able to cut its rental loss from $21,546 to
$15,037, a $6,509 savings.

(Exhibit 7-P)

In addition to this $15,037 rental loss, SCM Land spent
$400 to partition Suite 606 for its new tenants.

(R. 219)

ARGUMENT
POINT I
WATKINS & FABER'S EVIDENCE OF AN ALLEGED
ORAL PROMISE TO MAKE A WRITTEN LEASE FOR
ADDITIONAL SPACE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN
ADMITTED.
INSTEAD THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD
HAVE DIRECTED A VERDICT ON LIABILITY FOR
SCM LAND.
Construing the evidence in derogation of the jury verdict, Watkins & Faber argues that Fischer orally "agreed that
he would enter into a written lease for additional space on

-6-

the Sixth Floor by at least December, 1979."

(R. 314)

Although it was never discussed, Watkins & Faber presumed
that the term of this written lease for additional space
would be at least two and one-half years.
2-P, '

lC).

(R. 314; Exhibit

Simply put, Watkins & Faber claims an oral

promise to make a written lease for at least a two and
one-half year period.

Whether characterized as consideration

or a condition precedent, the alleged oral promise is the
same and must be cognizable at law for Watkins & Faber to
pursue a defense of either failure of consideration or the
non-performance of a condition precedent.
A.

Fischer's Alleged Oral Promise to Make a Written
Lease Is Void Under the Statute of Frauds.

The Statute of Frauds governing realty leases states:
Every contract for the leasing [of any land) for a
period longer than one year, • • • shall be void
unless the contract, or some note or memorandum
thereof, is in writing subscribed by the party to
whom the lease • • • is to be made • • • •
Utah Code Ann.,

§

25-5-3.

In Utah Mercur Gold Mining Co. v.

Herschel Gold Mining Co., 103 Utah 249, 134 P.2d 1094, 1096
(1953), this court ruled:
[An) oral agreement to make a written lease is
governed by the Statute of Frauds the same as if an
oral lease was made. An oral agreement to make a
contract which must itself be in writing is itself
within the Statute of Frauds.
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Thus the court there held that an oral contract to renew a
lease for a five year term was void.
The jury has already found that there was no agreement.
Thus, the most Watkins & Faber can argue is that Fischer made
an oral promise to make a written lease for additional
space.

This written lease was to be for a period longer than

one year.

Under Utah Mercur Gold this alleged oral promise

must satisfy the Statute of Frauds or it is void.

Since

there was no writing evidencing this alleged oral promise, it
is void.

Being void, evidence of the alleged oral promise

was inadmissible.
mitted error.

Having admitted it, the trial court com-

Instead of submitting Watkins & Faber's

defense to the jury, the trial court should have granted SCM
Land's motion for partial summary judgment and motion for a
directed verdict on liability.

Since the jury reached the

proper result by rejecting Watkins & Faber's defense, the
error was harmless and the judgment should be affirmed.
Watkins & Faber's reliance on FMA Financial Corporation
v. Hanson Dairy, Inc., 617 P.2d 327 (Utah 1980) and Nielson
v. MFT Leasing, 656 P.2d 454 (Utah 1982), for the admissibility of the alleged oral promise is misplaced.
evidence cases.

Both are parol

Even assuming the alleged oral promise is

admissible as parol evidence, it still violates the Statute
of Frauds.

The test is not either the parol evidence rule or
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the Statute of Frauds, but both.

Having failed to satisfy

the Statute of Frauds, Watkins & Faber's argument fails.
B.

Fischer's Alleged Oral Promise was Not Recorded and
Is Therefore Unenforceable Aqainst SCM Land, a Bona
Fide Purchaser.

As defined in Utah Code Ann., S 57-1-1, a conveyance of
an interest in realty includes a lease for a period longer
than one year.

Pursuant to Utah Code Ann., S 57-3-3, such a

lease is unenforceable against a subsequent good faith purchaser for valuable consideration unless the lease is recorded.

Fischer's alleged oral promise was to make a lease

for a period longer than one year.

Consequently, it must

have been recorded to be enforceable against a subsequent
purchaser in good faith and for valuable consideration.
Since there was no writing, Watkins & Faber did not record
their alleged interest.

Thus, if SCM Land was a subsequent

good faith purchaser for valuable consideration, the alleged
oral promise is unenforceable against it.
SCM Land purchased the Newhouse Building for $3,200,000
subsequent to the alleged oral promise.

(R. 187)

Thus SCM

Land was a subsequent purchaser for valuable consideration.
When SCM Land purchased the Newhouse Building, Watkins &
Faber only occupied Suite 606 as provided in the July 1979
written lease agreement.

Neither the written lease agree-

ment, Suite 606 or Watkins & Faber's possession of Suite 606
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gave SCM Land inquiry notice of an alleged oral promise to
enter into a written lease agreement for space then occupied
by another tenant.

Thus, SCM Land purchased in good faith.

Being a subsequent good faith purchaser for valuable consideration, the unrecorded alleged interest of Watkins &
Faber is not enforceable against SCM Land.

Being unenforce-

able, evidence of the alleged oral promise was inadmissible.
Having admitted it, the trial court committed error.

Instead

of submitting Watkins & Faber's defense to the jury, the
trial court should have granted SCM Land's motion for partial
summary judgment and motion for directed verdict on liability.

Since the jury reached the proper result by rejecting

Watkins & Faber's defense, the error was harmless and the
judgment should be affirmed.
During the trial, Watkins & Faber argued that SCM Land
had a duty to inquire of Watkins & Faber whether they claimed
an unrecorded interest in space occupied by another tenant.
The trial court properly rejected this argument.

{R. 331)

As explained by this court in Tolend v. Corey, 6 Utah 392, 24
P. 190 (1890), a purchaser is only on inquiry notice of those
facts about which a prudent man might inquire based upon what
he knows.

The facts known by SCM Land would not make a pru-

dent man inquire whether Watkins & Faber had an oral promise
to lease space then occupied by another tenant.
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Having

failed to satisfy the recording statute, Watkins & Faber's
argument fails.

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REJECTED THE
FAILURE OF CONSIDERATION DEFENSE SINCE A
PROMISE TO AGREE IN THE FUTURE IS NUGATORY
AND THEREFORE CANNOT BE CONSIDERATION FOR
AN OTHERWISE ENFORCEABLE CONTRACT.
Watkins & Faber does not argue that the written lease
agreement for Suite 606 is not binding on them.

Rather they

contend that under the parol evidence rule Fischer's promise
to make a future agreement was an unwritten term of the written lease agreement, that this term represented part of the
consideration for the written lease, and that this consideration failed.

The trial court ruled that unless this oral

term to agree in the future was an enforceable contract, the
oral term was nugatory.

Being nugatory, it cannot be consid-

eration and therefore cannot fail.
The correctness of the trial court's ruling is elementary
contract law.
[U]nless an agreement to make a future contract is
definite and certain upon all the subjects to be
embraced, it is nugatory.
To be enforceable, a contract to enter into a future contract must specify
all its material and essential terms and leave none
to be agreed upon as the result of future negotiations . • • • If any essential term is left open for
future consideration, there is no binding contract,
and an agreement to reach an agreement imposes no
obligation on the parties thereto.
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17 Am.Jur.2d Contracts

S 26.

This principle is so elementary

that this court saw no need to "multiply authority" on the
proposition and simply stated:
Where the parties have left an essential part of the
agreement for future determination, it is no doubt
correct to say that the contract is not complete.
Hi-Way Motor Co. v. Service Motor Co., 68 Utah 65, 249 P.133,

135 (1926).
Consistent with this law, the trial court submitted a
special interrogatory to the jury on whether there was an
oral contract to enter into a written lease agreement.

The

jury was properly instructed on mutual assent and essential
terms.

&

(Jury Instruction No. 17)

Fa~er's

After considering Watkins

evidence, against which SCM Land offered no evi-

dence, the jury concluded there was no oral contract.

Thus

the oral promise to make a future agreement was nugatory and
not consideration.
Watkins & Faber suggests that FMA Financial Corporation
and Nielsen mandate an opposite result.

As already dis-

cussed, these are parol evidence cases.

They do not address

the issue of promises to agree in the future as consideration.
Watkins & Faber also argues that even if not specifically
enforceable, the promise to agree in the future can still be
the basis for rescission.

This argument must fail.

Hair-

splitting between enforceability and excuse is a distinction
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without a difference.
agree in the future.

Both depend upon an oral promise to
In either event the promise to agree

must be cognizable at law to enforce the contract or excuse
performance.

When the jury determined it was not, the matter

was set to rest.
Even assuming the admissibility of the evidence supporting an oral promise to agree in the future, the promise was
nugatory and not consideration.
POINT III
SINCE WATKINS & FABER RECEIVED WHAT THEY
BARGAINED FOR IN THE WRITTEN LEASE AGREEMENT, THERE WAS NO FAILURE OF CONSIDERATION.
Assuming that an oral promise to make a future agreement
can be consideration and that the parol evidence rule allows
it to be a part of the written lease agreement for Suite 606,
there was no failure of consideration.

To have a failure of

consideration, Watkins & Faber must have failed to receive
what they bargained for.

But what did they bargain for?

First, they bargained for and received Suite 606.

Second,

they bargained for Fischer's promise, not for his performance
of the promise.

This they received as well.

As explained at trial:
Mr. Fischer asked me if I was ready to sign the
lease, and I said, "No, not unless we have a promise
of the space next door." And he said that was no
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problem, that he would promise the space next door.
(R. 296) [Emphasis added]
Simply put, Faber said that if Fischer would give him a promise to make a future agreement, he would execute the written
lease.

Like many situations, the performance required was to

give a promise.

When the promise was given, Fischer's per-

formance was executed.

Watkins & Faber even argued at trial

and in its Appellant's Brief that the "oral promise for additional space" should have been treated "as consideration
paid."

(Appellant's Brief, p. 9, emphasis added)

With the

"consideration paid", Watkins & Faber performed their obligation by signing the written lease.

Only the written terms of

the lease agreement remained executory.

Since those terms

were fulfilled by the Landlord, there was no failure of consideration.
POINT IV
SINCE FISCHER'S ORAL PROMISE WAS NOT
BROKEN, THERE WAS NO FAILURE OF CONSIDERATION.
Assuming that the bargain not only required Fischer to
give a promise, but also to perform the promise, only the
failure to perform that promise gives rise to a failure of
consideration defense. To this point, the argument has been
premised on Watkins & Faber's characterization that the promise was to enter into a written lease for additional space
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on the Sixth Floor by at least December, 1979.

Since this

written lease was never executed, Watkins & Faber argues
failure of consideration.

However, this view construes the

evidence in derogation of the jury verdict.

As the prevail-

ing party, SCM Land is entitled to have the evidence viewed
in support of the verdict.

When viewed in this light, the

promise was not as characterized by Watkins & Faber.
Watkins & Faber called as their first witness at trial
Kenneth P. Swinton, Fischer's building manager.

Swinton

testified that Fischer promised that "when I.M.L. moved he
would let Watkins & Faber have that [additional] space."
274)

(R.

He also testified that there was no promise to evict

I.M.L. so that Watkins & Faber could have the additional
space.

(R. 275)

Althouqh Watkins & Faber claims that the

written lease for this additional space was to have been executed by December 1979, December came and went without the
written lease or a demand from Watkins & Faber.

(R. 238)

Watkins & Faber made no demand because I.M.L. had not moved.
These facts, together with Watkins & Faber's failure to put
this "critical" promise in the written lease for Suite 606
support the conclusion that Fischer's promise was to provide
additional space when I.M.L. moved.
move, the promise was not broken.
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Since I.M.L. did not
Thus the jury's determina-

tion that if there was an oral contract, it was not breached,
precludes a failure of consideration defense.

POINT V
SINCE WATKINS & FABER FAILED TO ACT WITHIN
A REASONABLE TIME AFTER THE ALLEGED BREACH
OF THE ORAL PROMISE, THERE WAS NO FAILURE
OF CONSIDERATION.
Again assuming that the bargain required Fischer's performance of the promise and assuming that the promise was as
characterized by Watkins & Faber, Watkins & Faber must show
that they acted within a reasonable time after the alleged
breach in order to have their performance excused.
When December 1979 passed without a written lease for the
additional space, Watkins & Faber failed to make any demand
on Fischer for performance.

(R. 238)

To the contrary,

Watkins & Faber never demanded of Fischer that he perform.
(R. 238)

Instead, Watkins & Faber waited nine months before

making a demand and then made it on a subsequent purchaser
that knew nothing of the oral promise and that had already
leased the space to its longstanding occupant.

Thus the

jury's determination that if there was an oral contract,
Watkins & Faber did not act within a reasonable time to
rescind the written lease precludes a failure of consideration defense.
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POINT VI
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE JURY'S FINDINGS
THAT SCM LAND MITIGATED ITS DAMAGES BY MOVING NORWEST FROM SUITE 305 TO SUITE 606.
For seven months after Watkins & Faber vacated Suite 606,
SCM Land tried unsuccessfully to relet their space.

By

October 1981 this accounted for a $1,458 monthly rental
loss.

To minimize this loss, SCM Land allowed an existing

tenant out of its lease agreement for Suite 305 so that it
could move to a portion of Suite 606.

As a result of this

move, SCM Land lost $717 monthly rentals for Suite 305 but
gained $1,212 in rentals for that portion of Suite 606.
reduced SCM loss by $495 monthly.

This

Five months later Norwest

leased another portion of Suite 606 for $371 monthly, all of
which reduced SCM Land's rental loss from Watkins & Faber's
breach of the Lease Agreement.

Had SCM Land not allowed

Norwest to move, it would have suffered an additional rental
loss of $5,939, all of which would have been damages.

(Exhi-

bit 7-P, R. 200-218)
At trial Watkins & Faber argued that SCM Land should not
have allowed Norwest to move from Suite 305 to Suite 606.
Since the move saved $5,939, the argument is difficult to
understand.

However, it is not difficult to understand what

Watkins & Faber would have argued had SCM Land passed up the
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opportunity to save nearly $6,000.

In any event, the trial

court allowed a special verdict on the issue:
Under all the circumstances was it reasonable for
plaintiff to allow Norwest Resource Consultants,
Incorporated to vacate Suite 305 and move to Suite
606 and then charge the rent loss from Suite 305 as
damages against defendants?
The jury answered "yes."

(R. 336)

Since the evidence sup-

ports this verdict, it should be upheld.
Watkins & Faber argues that since Norwest's lease for
Suite 305 would have expired in April 1982, the rental loss
from Suite 305 for May and June 1982 should not be allowed.
This argument has already been made to the jury and rejected.

It should be rejected again.
POINT VII
THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF PREJUDGMENT
INTEREST AT THE EXISTING LEGAL RATES WAS
PROPER.
SCM Land submitted a proposed judgment with prejudgment

interest at ten percent per annum, the rate in effect after
May 13, 1981.

Watkins & Faber argued that the rate should be

six percent as existed before May 14, 1981.

The trial court

ruled that the prejudgment rate would be six percent throuqh
May 13, 1981 and ten percent thereafter.

The trial court

made the change which diminished prejudgment interest by $9.
Although the bulk of SCM Land's damages arose after May 13,
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1981, and the liability was affixed in 1983, Watkins & Faber
argues that since the written lease was signed prior to May
13, 1981, the prejudgment rate is six percent.
This argument is premised on an unfounded assumption that
Utah Code Ann. S 15-1-1 prohibits using a prejudgment interest rate not in effect when the agreement was entered.
Rather the statute, with its predecessor, simply reads that
prejudgment interest is six percent until May 14, 1981 and
ten percent thereafter.

This has nothing to do with when the

agreement was signed especially since the agreement does not
even cover prejudgment interest.

As this court ruled in

Lignell v. Berg, 593 P.2d 800, 809 (Utah 1979), the operative
fact is when the amount became due.

From then on SCM Land

"is entitled to interest at the legal rate until payment is
made."

Scott v. Scott, 430 P.2d 580, 583

(Utah 1967).

CONCLUSION
In essence, this case presents a group of lawyers, who
failed to protect their interests, trying to shift their
losses to a good faith purchaser rather than to the person
who allegedly caused them.

As attorneys they could have

easily put the alleged agreement in writing so that a good
faith purchaser could have had notice of it.
not.

But they did

As attorneys they could have then recorded the writing
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to give constructive notice to a good faith purchaser.
they did not.

But

As a matter of long-established public policy

reflected in the Statute of Frauds and the Bona Fide Purchaser Rule, they should have prevented the conflict.

Havinq

failed to do so, they should bear the loss, not a good faith
purchaser.

The law requires this and the jury has agreed.

Even so, there was no breach of the alleqed promise to
agree in the future.

As lawyers should know, a promise to

agree in the future cannot be consideration.

Even if it

could be, all that was asked prior to the execution of the
written lease for Suite 606 was that a promise to agree be
given--and it was.

Furthermore, the promise was not breached

since I.M.L. never moved.

And even granting Watkins & Faber

all of this, as the jury concluded, they did not act within a
reasonable time after the alleged breach.
In all respects the jury verdict and judgment should be
affirmed.
DATED this

7-#1

day of September, 1983.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
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